Wolfgang Schwarz

Universalia in rebus and universalia ante res?

Here at Humboldt University, there's a reading group about analytic philosophy (Sam already mentioned it). The flyer advertising this group describes analytic philosophy as a sort of new and fascinating kind of philosophy characterised by its perspicuity and ignorance of philosophical tradition. The funny thing is that the organisers of the reading group decided that we'll be discussing David Wiggins' Sameness and Substance Renewed. I don't want to know how much Hegel one has to read to find Wiggins perspicuous (and ignorant of philosophical tradition).

Anyway, last week we briefly talked about the difference between the Aristotelean and the Platonist conception of universals, and I realised that even though I'm able to explain the difference, I don't understand it at all. On the Aristotelean conception, universals are somehow present in their instances, whereas on the Platonist conception, they exist in a separate, ideal realm, and merely stand in some odd relation R to their instances. Now could anybody believe that universals are really literally in their instances, that is, that they are spatiotemporally inside them, presumably as proper parts? I don't think so (see my note on Laurie Paul's Logical Parts theory). So the universalia in rebus are not literally "in" their instances. Rather, they stand in some relation R to their instances which can be metaphorically expressed by "in" (or by "logical parthood", or "unmereological parthood"). Do the Platonist and the Aristotelian only disagree about the usage of metaphors? The only real difference I can see anywhere in the vicinity of this dispute is whether or not one should accept non-instantiated universals.