Wolfgang Schwarz

Hi Wolfgang, thanks a lot for engaging! I want to stress again that I found your set of papers and your view extremely interesting, and that they are a great, innovative addition to the literature, although I think that they fail to account for what I take to be the explanandum here.
Here are points of disagreement with what you wrote in your blogpost that I think can help move the debate forward.

1/ First, when answering to my “illusionism” counterexample to the view that we are certain of our phenomenal experiences (i.e. we are not fully certain of our phenomenal experiences since some of us deny having phenomenal experiences) , you wrote that “Presumably the idea is that if we are certain that we have a particular phenomenal experience X then we couldn't coherently believe that we have no phenomenal experiences at all. But it's not part of my model that the imaginary propositions of which the agent becomes certain are conceptualised as "phenomenal experiences". If you ask an eliminativist or illusionist what they mean by 'phenomenal experience', they will give you an answer. They deny that we have experiences with such-and-such definitional properties. This theoretical claim is orthogonal to any imaginary proposition. I don't see a problem here.”

In response, I grant that illusionism is often understood as a thesis denying phenomenal consciousness understood as an entity having such-and-such definitional properties (e.g. see Dennett’s Quining Qualia). But I think that it can (and should) be understood as a view denying phenomenal consciousness, where PC is defined by using examples (many of them will arguably be introspectively grasped), which makes it more plausible that it is in fact bears precisely on what imaginary propositions are about. I still think you might have answers there (I signal them in my Erkenntnis paper: maybe you could distinguish different senses of “belief” so that illusionists believe* but do not believe that they have experiences in the relevant sense: see pp. 9-10 of my article).
For more about my understanding of illusionism as other than the denial of phenomenal consciousness understood as an entity having such-and-such definitional properties, I have a talk on the topic that was recorded: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bQvudFxez7w&ab_channel=TobiasSchlicht
(I have written a paper on the topic, currently under review)
Keith Frankish also wrote a blogpost where he leans in the same direction: https://www.keithfrankish.com/2022/12/a-dilemma-for-illusionists-and-another-for-realists/

2/ Second, I grant that the treatment you offer of the fraternity case and the visual field case are available - although I must first say that this is maybe more so for the fraternity case, as I’m not convinced that we can treat the visual field case as a case of merely classificatory mistake, nor as analogous to the speckled hen/14 or 15 pens issue you raise. I in fact suggested a similar move in the paper (see the same pp. 9-10). However, my view is that, particularly taken together with the “illusionism” counterexample (which I think is much more serious than what you say, for reasons explained above), they still put some pressure on the view.

3/ I can more or less agree with the sentence “when we have a given experience, it seems that we can rule out any situations in which we have a sufficiently different experience.”, although in an interpretation different from yours. Indeed, I think that this claim is true, but only if I interpret it as a claim about our naïve epistemology: that is, we have a certain naïve (arguably modular) theory of evidence/appearance according to which having a given experience makes us (epistemologically) certain that we have it (and that we are not in an experientially distinct situation). Hence, it is true that it seems to us (per our intuitive, modular and naïve theory) that having an experience makes us able to rule out (i.e. fully justifies us in ruling out) situations which are experientially distinct. But I disagree with the claim if it is interpreted (as you do) as the claim that, when we appropriately judge/represent that we have a given experience, then we have absolute (psychological) certainty that we have it (and that we are not in an experientially distinct situation). Of course, I’m ready to grant that we (ordinarily) have an extremely high level of confidence, but I don’t buy the absolute certainty (i.e. 100% confidence), for reasons presented above and that you discussed (the three counterexamples).
In the paper I only gestured at my own view, which crucially states that our introspective representations of experiences are laden by such a naïve epistemology (see p. 20 of my Erkenntnis paper). For more details on the view, see for instance:
https://philpapers.org/rec/KAMTMO-9
https://philpapers.org/rec/KAMTIO-4

4/ At the end of my day, my other reason to be dissatisfied with the account you put forth is the one you mention at the end of your blogpost: I’m not convinced that views such as yours explain our sense of acquaintance, which I take to be among our explanandum. In your response, you claim that, although psychological certainty about our experience is not the same thing as a sense of acquaintance about our experience, it can explain it, given that ”If we'd conform to my model, then stimulations of our sense organs would directly cause certainty in a corresponding imaginary proposition. We would come to be certain of something of which were previously uncertain. And we would do so without any kind of reasoning or inference. It would seem to us as if there are special kinds of facts that are directly presented or revealed to us when we have a perceptual experience.”
I take it that this is tantamount to the view that psychological certainty psychologically causes our sense of acquaintance, which is the view I critically examine in the section 5.2 of my Erkenntnis article. I give a couple of reasons to doubt that psychological certainty brings a sense of acquaintance. One comes from the counterexample of other forms of certainty (e.g. logico-mathematical certainties, which do not seem to beget a similar sense of acquaintance with the concerned entities). One comes from a thought experiment (I can easily imagine me being fully certain of something without feeling acquainted in the slightest). One comes from the example of monothematic delusions (in which subjects seem fully certain of unusual facts but do not seem to develop a sense of acquaintance).
None of these reasons constitutes a decisive argument that psychological certainty does NOT psychologically causes a sense of acquaintance (each counterexample can be answered, and I suggest some answers in the paper), but I take it that they show that we cannot easily take it for granted that it DOES. I would say that it at least put pressure on your account to show that it does. I would be happy in case you would like to say what you have to answer to this argument developed in section 5.2.

@Francois: Thanks, this is really helpful! Also thanks for criticizing my proposal. It's great to understand what flaws it might have and why others are not convinced.

A few quick responses to your points (1), (3), and (4), seeing as (2) isn't really an objection.

(1) Interesting. I've had a quick look at the sources you cite. As far as I can tell, the illusionist still assumes that the phenomenal experiences whose existence they deny necessarily play a certain theoretical role, even though they may not be /defined/ in terms of this role. My model doesn't suggest that we should be certain that we are in states with any particular theoretic role. My model only suggests that experiences make us certain of /something/.

(3) I agree that the intuition I treat as a datum -- that I can conclusively rule out ordinary scenarios in which I'm currently skiing -- could be rejected as an error. But I don't think your three counterexamples motivate such a rejection. (It doesn't imply any kind of infallibility about the exact details of one's experience, and I don't see why an illusionist would be committed to denying it.) I also think the intuition has considerable force. It's an advantage of my model that it can explain it. Of course, any claim whatsoever can be rejected, at least in a superficial, verbal manner. So I had better not say that my model predicts that everyone must accept the intuition as veridical. Fortunately it doesn't. It doesn't even predict that we must have the intuition. But it is easy to see why we *might* have the intuition, if my model is true.

(4) I don't think that psychological certainty always causes a sense of acquaintance. You're right to criticize this view. What I'm suggesting is that the *particular way* in which, on my model, perceptual experiences cause certainty towards phenomenal/imaginary propositions might explain our sense of acquaintance. To see whether this is plausible, I would need to understand better what the "sense of acquaintance" involves. You say, for example, that it is the "impression that experiences are presented to us in some sort of peculiarly direct, concrete, immediate and revelatory way". On my model, perceptual events directly and immediately provide us with new information. My conjecture is that we conceptualise these episodes as conscious experiences, and that we individuate such an experience by the relevant phenomenal/imaginary information that is conveyed. It would follow that we might naturally have the impression that normal perceptual events directly and immediately reveal to us that we have a certain experience.

@Wolfgang: Thanks for the answer!
On (1), I get your answer, but I think that the dialectic quickly becomes tricky. It’s true that I think that the phenomenal consciousness (that illusionists should deny) is defined merely by using examples/introspection, but that when we engage in such definition, our conception of these examples/our introspection in fact is laden as to make the states it grasps play a certain implicit folk-theoretical role. Then you might answer that the existence of illusionists about this form of consciousness does not threaten your view, since your view is that our conception of what we are fully certain about is not implicitly laden in this manner. But of course someone like me would answer that we have no conception of experiences that is no so implicitly laden, even when we do our best to get rid of all folk-theoretical ladenness, so that, if we can be certain of anything when it comes to consciousness, it must be something understood through our laden apprehension (and then, the existence of illusionists is a counterexample to the view that we are fully certain of THIS).
On (3): Maybe we are talking about slightly different things. My counterexamples were supposed to help reject the view that, when we represent that we have an experience, we are psychologically certain that we have it, and thus also that we are in some other experiential state incompatible with the experience we are representing ourselves as having. It was not meant to reject the view that really having an experience puts us in a position to conclusively rule out anything. I’m not sure I want to reject this view if it’s supposed to concern phenomenal experiences, whose existence I deny (the view might still be true about these non-instantiated phenomenal experiences, after all!). If the view is supposed to concern non-phenomenal experiences (e.g. perceptual processes that, as an illusionist, I admit exist), then I might be tempted to reject it, but for reasons that have nothing to do with my counterexamples.
On (4): Thanks for clarifying. If I understand your proposed explanation of our sense of acquaintance, our certainty towards “imaginary propositions” plays no particular role. All the explanantia you mention here (“perceptual events directly and immediately provide us with new information. My conjecture is that we conceptualise these episodes as conscious experiences, and that we individuate such an experience by the relevant phenomenal/imaginary information that is conveyed. It would follow that we might naturally have the impression that normal perceptual events directly and immediately reveal to us that we have a certain experience”) would hold even if we were not fully certain of imaginary propositions (but just, say, highly confident). Of course, it is compatible with us being fully certain of imaginary propositions, but it does not require it, and such certainty plays no explanatory role here.
In my paper, I was wondering if the view that we are fully certain of our experiences explains our sense of acquaintance with them, and I concluded that it does not . That the explanation you suggest here gives no obvious key role to certainty suggests that you are of the same opinion. Do you agree?

Thanks!

On (1): My model suggests that we become fully certain of something that is free of causal/functional implications. That one can be an illusionist about things that have causal/functional implications isn't a counterexample to this suggestion.

Perhaps it matters that I don't think of certainty as an attitude towards a sentence or "conceptually structured proposition". My suggestion isn't that we have mental words for what we become certain of.

This is probably also relevant to (3). The intuition I want to explain is, for example, that when I look out of the window at the snowy campus, while remembering having breakfast in my flat earlier, then I can conclusively rule out being in the remembered situation.

On (4): I agree that the view that we are fully certain of our experiences does not explain our sense of acquaintance. I do think, however, that the full certainty component of my model *helps* with the explanation of acquaintance. Isn't it part of the acquaintance intuition that the thing which with we're acquainted is fully revealed to us?

Thanks Wolfgang!

Re: 1: In my view, our standard concept of phenomenal consciousness (which we should be illusionist about) is laden as to make the states it grasps play a certain implicit folk-theoretical role, but this folk-theoretical role does not come with functional/causal implications, but with folk-epistemological implications (roughly, we grasp phenomenal states as states with which we are in a certain immediate epistemological relation, and which fulfill a certain evidential role). Of course, you don't have to buy this particular view, but I take that the most plausible forms of illusionism deny the existence of something which is not defined in terms of a causal/functional role.

Re: 4: I don't know : maybe I would like to hear more about exactly how one (full certainty towards a proposition) is supposed to psychologically cause the other (intuition that the truthmaker of the proposition is fully revealed, or something like this). Although section 5.2 of my Erkenntnis paper focuses on cases of full certainty without sense of acquaintance (and not specifically without sense of revelation), at least some of them are also plausibly cases where a sense of revelation is absent (e.g. the case of monothematic delusions, where subjects do not seem to claim that they are infallible about the delusional fact - they just claim with full confidence that the fact obtains).

Thanks. Just on (4): I hope you agree that these two claims are not equivalent:

(a) Certainty plays a role in explaining acquaintance.
(b) Certainty explains acquaintance.

I'm saying (a), you're denying (b).

Thanks, Wolfgang. I fully agree that (a) and (b) are not equivalent! In my paper, I argued against (b) by way of counterexamples. I think that (a) is a sort of claim that cannot be straightforwardly argued against by way of counterexamples. To assess (a) at this stage, I would like to understand more about the exact role certainty plays in explaining acquaintance (ideally, showing that this role is key to the arising of the sense of acquaintance, and could not been played easily by something other than certainty).
I grant that denying (b) does not prove that (a) is false, but I think that it puts some pressure on the defender of (a), to show exactly the psychological role of certainty. First, because one way in which (a) could have been true is if (b) were true. Second, because the counterexamples I used to argue against (b), in so far as you admit that they are genuine counterexamples (maybe you don't!), put constraints on potential vindications of (a) (e.g. the explanation of the sense of acquaintance, in which certainty will then play just a part, should ideally explain why a sense of acquaintance not arising in the sort of counterexamples I discussed).
It might be that your model has the resources to answer this request, but it is not (yet?) obvious to me at this stage.

Hello both, thank you for this exchange which I find very helpful, trying to understand the issues surrounding acquaintance. My impression has been that, according to Wolfgang's (great) Ergo paper, psychological certainty is meant to (help) explain our sense of revelation that our sense of acquaintance seems to crucially involve. In particular, if having certainty with respect to an experience is a matter of being able to conclusively rule out that I'm having any experience that is sufficiently different from the experience I'm actually having, then, arguably, there is a sense in which I thereby know the essence of the experience I'm having, which means that the experience is revealed to me. This at least seems to be (approximately) the line Lewis takes in his 1995 paper that Wolfgang refers to. @Wolfgang, I wonder if this was roughly what you had in mind when you wrote above "I do think, however, that the full certainty component of my model *helps* with the explanation of acquaintance. Isn't it part of the acquaintance intuition that the thing which with we're acquainted is fully revealed to us?"?

@Jakub: Yes, I think the certainty aspect is important to explaining the intuition of revelation. And I guess revelation is somehow related to acquaintance.

I've outlined a possible explanation of acquaintance above: Suppose my model is correct for a certain agent, and suppose the agent conceptualises perceptual episodes as "conscious experiences" and individuates their type by the phenomenal/imaginary information that is conveyed -- same information, same type of "experience"; different information, different type of "experience". One would then expect that the agent has the impression that normal perceptual episodes directly, immediately, and conclusively reveal to her that she has a certain type of experience.

If a sense of acquaintance is an "impression that experiences are presented to us in some sort of peculiarly direct, concrete, immediate and revelatory way" (Kammerer), then this would arguably explain the agent's sense of acquaintance.

@Wolfgang Thank you, that's very helpful.