A common assumption in economics is that utilities are reducible to choice
dispositions. The story goes something like this. Suppose we know what an agent
would choose if she were asked to pick one from a range of goods. If the agent
is disposed to choose X, and Y was an available alternative, we say that the
agent prefers X over Y. One can show that if the agent's choice
dispositions satisfy certain formal constraints, then they are "representable"
by a utility function in the sense that whenever the agent prefers X over Y,
the function assigns greater value to X than to Y. This utility function is
assumed to be the agent's true utility function, telling us how much the agent
values the relevant goods.
In my 2014 paper "Against Magnetism", I
argued that the meta-semantics Lewis defended in "Putnam's Paradox" and pp.45-49
of "New Work" is (a) unattractive, (b) does not fit what Lewis wrote about
meta-semantics elsewhere, and (c) was never Lewis's considered view.
In a
paper forthcoming in the AJP, Frederique Janssen-Lauret and Fraser Macbride
(henceforth, JL&M) disagree with my point (b), and present what they call
"decisive evidence" against (c). Here's my response. In short, I'm not
convinced.
There should be a website (or app) that helps with the following kinds of issues.
- I recently wrote a paper on ability modals in which I sketch some ideas for
how a certain linguistic phenomenon might be compositionally derived. I'm really
unsure about that part of the paper, because I'm not an expert in the relevant
areas of formal semantics. I'd like to get advice from an expert, but none of my
friends are, and I don't want to bother people I don't know.
- I once wrote a paper on decision-theoretic methods in non-consequentialist
ethics. But I don't know much about ethics. I'd need someone to tell me how non-consequentialists typically think about decisions under uncertainty, who has already tried to sell decision-theoretic methods for that purpose,
and what key papers I need to read.
- When I submit papers to journals, I often get rejections pointing out
problems that are easy to fix. It would have been good if someone had pointed
out these problems to me before I submitted the paper.
- I think many of my drafts and papers are a little hard to understand, but
I'm not sure why. I'd like someone to give me feedback on which passages are
confusing, where a reader might get lost, etc.
Basically, I'd like to hire (different kinds of) referees to look over my drafts
and give me constructive feedback.
Last week, I gave a talk in Manchester at a
(very nice) workshop on "David Lewis and His Place in the History of Analytic
Philosophy". My talk was on "Lewis's empiricism". I've now written it up as a
paper, since it got too long for a blog post.
The paper is really about hyperintensional epistemology. The question is how we
can make sense of the kind of metaphysical enquiry Lewis was engaged in if we
accept his models of knowledge and belief, which leave no room for substantive
investigations into non-contingent matters.
I wrote this short
piece for a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies on
Chalmers's "The Meta-Problem
of Consciousness" (2018). Much of my paper rehashes ideas from section 5 of
my "Imaginary
Foundations" paper, but here I try to present these ideas more simply and
directly, without the Bayesian background.
In this
2018 paper, J. Dmitri Gallow shows that it is difficult to combine
multiple deference principles. The argument is a little complicated,
but the basic idea is surprisingly simple.
Suppose A and B are two weather forecasters. Let r be the
proposition that it will rain tomorrow, let A=x be the proposition
that A assigns probability x to r; similarly for B=x. Here are two
deference principles you might like to follow:
Consider a world where eating doughnuts is illegal and where everyone
thinks it is OK to torture animals for fun. Suppose Norman at w is
eating doughnuts while torturing his pet kittens. Is he violating the
laws? Is he doing something immoral?
In one sense, yes, in another, no. His doughnut eating violates the
laws of w, but not the laws of our world. Conversely,
his kitten torturing violates a moral code accepted at our world, but
not a code accepted at w.
I recently refereed Eliezer Yudkowsky and Nate Soares's "Functional Decision Theory" for a philosophy journal. My recommendation was to accept resubmission with major revisions, but since the article had already undergone a previous round of revisions and still had serious problems, the editors (understandably) decided to reject it. I normally don't publish my referee reports, but this time I'll make an exception because the authors are well-known figures from outside academia, and I want to explain why their account has a hard time gaining traction in academic philosophy. I also want to explain why I think their account is wrong, which is a separate point.
On the modal analysis of belief, 'S believes that p' is true iff p is
true at all possible worlds compatible with S's belief state. So
'believes' is a necessity modal. One might expect there to be a dual
possibility modal, a verb V such that 'S Vs that p' is true iff p is
true at some worlds compatible with S's belief state. But there
doesn't seem to be any such verb in English (or German). Why not?
What do we use if we want to say that something is compatible with
someone's beliefs? Suppose at some worlds compatible with Betty's
belief state, it is currently snowing. We could express this by "Betty
does not believe that it is not snowing". But (for some reason) that's
really hard to parse.
Gibbard's 1981 paper "Two recent theories of conditionals" contains
a famous passage about a poker game on a riverboat.
Sly Pete and Mr. Stone are playing poker on a Mississippi
riverboat. It is now up to Pete to call or fold. My henchman Zack sees
Stone's hand, which is quite good, and signals its content to Pete. My
henchman Jack sees both hands, and sees that Pete's hand is rather
low, so that Stone's is the winning hand. At this point, the room is
cleared. A few minutes later, Zack slips me a note which says "If Pete
called, he won," and Jack slips me a note which says "If Pete called,
he lost." I know that these notes both come from my trusted henchmen,
but do not know which of them sent which note. I conclude that Pete
folded.
One puzzle raised by this scenario is that it seems perfectly
appropriate for Zack and Jack to assert the relevant conditionals, and
neither Zack nor Jack has any false information. So it seems that the
conditionals should both be true. But then we'd have to deny that 'if
p then q' and 'if p then not-q' are contrary.